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An Abstract 
Argentina in 1976 was a place of unusual paradox. 
The government with more than 60% of the popular vote seemed 
to have crumbled to the ground with almost no backing from 
those who had put it into office. Its downfall was due to 
its inability to resolve the "national crisis" facing the 
nation. 
On 24 March 1976, the military finally intervened 
via a coup d'etat. Under the new regime, violations of human 
rights have been reported and protests have been made by lead-
ing human rights movements. The military junta argues that 
its policies and course of actions are necessary for the res-
toration of civic and economic order and the elimination of 
an internal threat from communism. 
What plunged Argentina into a state of chaos was 
violence, which has mounted progressively since the late-50s 
as groups with widely different political objectives and con-
ceptions struggle for power. The utilization of violence 
410002 
spread like a contagious disease from which no one remains 
immune. Tragically being touched are the lives of a growing 
number of defenseless victims who are either kidnapped, dis-
appear, or even coldly murdered. Indiscriminate and unres-
tricted acts of violence have turned every place one can ima-
gine into a battlefield in which there is no known refuge. 
Few countries in the world have experienced a dete-
rioration of human rights conditions comparable to that felt 
in Argentina in recent years. This study attempts to present 
the inevitable contradiction between a government deploying 
tactics of repression to resolve the very political and eco-
nomic problems repression aggravates. Naturally, it is accep-
tableto most people that a government must maintain public 
order and preserve the safety of its subjects. Further, it is 
also acceptable that in the life of any nation, threats to the 
public order or to the personal safety of its inhabitants, by 
persons or groups that use violence, can reach such proportions 
that it becomes necessary, temporarily, to suspend the privi-
lege of certain human rights. But to use terror as a form of 
regular and normal government? 
When a government enjoys a broad popular support, 
which is the case of the Videla regime, it seems certain that 
the method of confronting the threat of "left-wing terrorisn" 
through legal means will always be successful. The reestab-
lishment of civic and economic order can not possibly be 
achieved by undertaking acts of establishment terroriso. This 
necessitates the search for alternative solutions. 
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AN OVERVIEW 
Argentina in 1976 was a place of an unusual paradox 
(see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977; Rock, 1978; Smith, 
1980). The government with more than 60% of popular votes 
seemed to have crumbled to the ground --with almost no sup-
port from those who have put it to office because of its in-
ability to solve the crisis nacional (national crisis) facing 
the nation (see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977 and 1979), 
Indeed, the government of Marfa Estela Mart!nez de Per6n faced 
not only problems of political violence 1 but also the rapid 
2 deterioration of the Argentine economy. The military was 
reluctant to intervene in the political processes despite 
increasing urges of the masses to do so. What was evident, 
1. Violence is deep rooted. It became widespreaded 
since 1969 and mounted progressively from the left to the 
right as groups with different political objectives and con-
ceptions struggled for power. Terrorism had also taken on 
broad dimensions. Bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and 
assassinations for political purposes were not uncommon. This 
was what Isabel Peron inherited (see eg., Fernandez, 1976; 
Rock, 1978). 
2. In 1974, inflation rose to 40.1% (Jordan, 
1977: 5). The increase was the result of the imposition of 
wage and price controls which furthered the distortions in 
the economy. In 1975, several attempts (the repeal of the 
absentee clause oi' the labor law, the granting oi' permission 
for state-owned companies to charge prices covering costs, 
the encouragement for foreign investment, and the attempt to 
curtail the budget deficit) were made to lower the rapid rise 
in prices and to check the worsening of the balance of payment 
(OAS, 1979: 2). These attempts, however, produced no result. 
1 
2 
however, was a strong sense of disunity between both the 
government and the military. 3 On the one hand the govern-
ment feared that by asking the military to help it solve the 
political crisis --the mounting violence that seemed intermi-
nable-- would, in fact, be inviting military rule again. And 
4 for its part, the military clearly did not want to help. 
Many Argentines told me that they would rather be 
under the military rule than under the peronist regime. Month 
after month, rumors were spreaded about military plots to take 
over. But nothing of that nature occurred. On the night of 
23 March 1976, however, news that troops from Magdalena had 
moved into the capital lifted away all doubts. 5 The military 
had decided to step in. 
3. It was when I arrived at the Ezeiza Airport, 
located on the outskirt of Buenos Aires, that I learned that 
only three days earlier certain Sector of the military had 
been conspiring to overthrow the government. In effect, on 
18 December 1975, the disaffected sectors of the Air Force 
rose up in a rebellion against the government of Mrs. Peron. 
They disavowed the authority of the national government and 
called upon Lt. Gen. Videla to assume command of the republic 
in the name of the armed forces. Videla, however, declined 
.the offer and intervened instead against the rebels. The 
symptom was temporarily cured on 22 December. Fernandez noted 
this as the concept of institucionalidad or the preservation 
of the institutions (1976: 73), 
4. As one high ranking official said unofficially, 
"Why should we risk our necks so that the peronist can stay in 
office and ruin the country?" 
5, I recalled my father waking me up on the morning 
of 24 March 1976 and told me of the coup. We turned on the 
radio and tuned it on radio nacional. It was playing the 
soundtrack from the movie The Sting --an appropriate tune, 
we laughed. It was today and everyone seemed to have expected 
it. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Under the regime of Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael 
Videla violations of human rights in Argentina have been 
reported and protests have been made by such bodies as 
Amnesty International, the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, the Argentine Commission for Human Rights, the Perma~ 
nent Assembly for Human Rights, and other major human rights 
. t· 6 organiza ions. Moreover, it is said that "few countries 
in the world have experienced a deterioration in human rights 
conditions comparable to that felt in Argentina in recent 
years" (Department of State, 1980a: 17), The ruling junta, 
on the other hand, argued that "its policies and actions have 
been necessary to restore civic and economic order and to 
eliminate a serious threat to the country from domestic commu-
nism" (Department of State, 1980a: 17), 
This study is, therefore, an attempt to present 
insights to the political conflicts in present day Argentina. 
The author will attempt to encompass the followings into the 
scope of the study: 
6. Among them: National Council of Churches, the 
US Catholic Conference, the World Council of Churches, the 
B'nai Brith Anti-Defamation League, the AFL-CIO, the Execu-
tive Committee of International Labor Organization, the 
Council for Hemisphere Affairs, and the International Com-
mission of Jurists. 
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a) the politics of repression leads to instability 
b) two terrorist groups employ the use of the poli-
tics of repression as means to achieve their objectives 
c) these two terrorist groups can be classified as 
the establishment terrorists (the government) and the 
revolutionary terrorists 
d) the contradiction is inevitable with respect to 
the employment of the politics of repression on the part 
of the establishment terrorists since instability and 
decline economic growth are the results of such tactic 
--to. bringforth the restoration of civic and economic 
order would necessarily mean the seeking of alternative 
routes. 
DEFINITIONS 
Human Rights 
There are two fundamental frameworks of human rights: 
the integrity of the person and the civil and political liber-
ties of the individuals. The former includes freedom from: 
torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
the denial of fair public trial; and the invasion of the home 
(see eg., Department of State, December 1979). The latter 
includes freedom of: speech, religion, and assembly; movement 
within the country, foreign travel and emigration; and the 
5 
participation in the political processes. 
When these two fundamental frameworks are denied: 
when thousands of people are in preventive detention without 
charges or trials and thousands more remained unaccounted for; 
when there is no indication that the ruling regime will return 
the country to constitutional rule or that it will relax the 
emergency legislation introduced to suppress its citizen, 
despite popular call for a return to a democratic government 
and the restoration of the rule of the law --as it is alleged 
to be the case of Argentina-- it is the purpose of this study 
to seek understanding of what had happened that led to the 
denial and abuse of these rights. 
Terrorism 
Political and ideological violence, which sometimes 
arises from and contributes to such conflict, includes what 
is commonly known as terrorism. According to the Brockhaus 
Encyclopaedia, terrorism is the form of the political strug-
gle for power in order to induce a state to commit reciprocal 
acts, to shake the confidence in the existing system, and to 
intimidate the majority of the population (Middendorf, 1979: 
89), Karanovic defines terrorism as ''systematic and organized 
violence against nonresisting persons to create fear in them 
for the purpose of using that authority for exploitation or 
opposition or to extract political concession" (1979: 81). 
6 
In the Argentine context, we may classified te~ro-
rism into two categories: the revolutionary terrorists who 
engage in action of resisting an oppressive totalitarian 
regime; and the establishment terrorists who employ such tac-
tic for the purpose of protecting and preventing harmful ele-
ments from the society. 7 
Political Repression 
Political repression is almost impossible to define. 
The word "repression" connotes the acts of constraining. We 
seek here, in this study, to find out how political activities 
are constrained and by what means are these acts of constrain 
exercised. 
For the purpose of our analysis we can perhaps sum 
up categorically the concept of political repression in the 
context of the Argentine scenario as followed: 
a) it is an organized system utilized by both the 
establishment and the revolutionary terrorists 
b) it is an old tradition inherited by various 
groups along the political spectrum to achieve specific 
goals 
7. It must be taken into account that one man's 
freedom fighter is another man's terrorists as one man's 
tyrannical regime is another's benevolent regime. 
7 
c) this organized system is aimed at psychological 
results 
d) the purpose of this aim is to create an emotional 
state of extreme fear in specific groups and thereby to 
ultimately change their behavior and dispositions, or to 
bring about a general or particular change in the struc-
ture of society 
e) there is an exhibition of force which will trans-
form the society ~-this exhibition of force is to demon-
strate the authority for exploitation or oppression or 
to extract political concession 
f) there is effort to systematically eliminate poli-
tical opposition which obstructs the path to the control 
of power 
g) the result is the psychological feeling of terror, 
helplessness, and depression among the masses so that they 
refrain from opposition, resistance, or demonstration. 
DELIMITATION OF 
THE STUDY 
This study is an analysis of the political conflict 
in Argentina, 1976-79, It is the intention of the author to 
demonstrate through descriptive means and observations that 
the use of the politics of repression bringsforth instability. 
In doing this study, the author will try to provide his readers 
8 
with background information in the areas of politics and,the 
economy preceeding the Videla regime which are relevant in 
understanding present day Argentina. 
There are, without any doubt, topics that the author 
will not be able to provide adequate treatment of. Peronism, 
for instance, deserves a separate study by itself, The author 
tries to keep the scope of his study narrow for the purpose 
of manageability. 
The topic of political repression is indeed sensi-
tive in nature. Therefore, in attempting to evaluate and 
to interpret this study, the author would like his readers to 
be aware of a number of serious problems including factors 
other than human rights which may have important consequences 
on the political situation in Argentina. Also the readers 
should bear in mind the study's delimitations when considering 
any plausible conclusions that might be drawn from it. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
There exists a wide range of information on the 
topics of both human rights and terrorism. Nevertheless, 
materials which deal, in substance, specifically with both 
topics in the Argentine setting are indeed scarced. Hence, 
the author focuses upon subject matters which have direct 
impact on the topic in question. The sources, for the use 
in this study, may be classified into the following cate-
9 
gories: 
a) human rights documents - under this headings are 
included many items such as Amnesty International reports, 
Comite de defense de droits de l'homme, Human Rights 
reports prepared by the US Department of State, Congres-
sional Hearings on Human Rights practices, for instance 
b) social science documents - there are many history, 
political, economics, and social documents which are 
relevant to this study. Sources for these documents 
include newspaper articles, editorials, books, periodicals, 
and essaies. 
PROCEDURES 
Primary and Secondary Documents 
This study is conducted through an examination and 
analysis of both available primary and secondary sources. 
Primary documents were gathered during the time the author was 
enrolled in the Universidad Cat6lica Argentina in Buenos Aires 
from March 1976 to July 1978. This experience proved extremely 
helpful to him in evaluating and assessing materials employed 
in the study. It also allowed him to comprehend the complexi-
ty of the situation in Argentina. 
Documents from Amnesty International and Comite de 
defense des droits de l'homme were gathered during the author's 
, . 
short seJour in New York and Paris. Documents from the 
10 
Argentine Embassy, which were given to the author while in 
Paris, are also relevant to the study. Documents from the 
US Department of State and Congressional Hearings are also 
considered to be primary source and they are used in this 
study. 
Secondary documents include French, Spanish, and 
English books and periodicals related to the topic. These 
two sources have been compiled and analyzed in the hope of 
shedding light to further the understanding of the political 
conflict in Argentina. 
Research Methods 
Different research approaches are employed in this 
study. The author would like to mention only briefly about 
them. For readers who are interested in the topic, the 
author suggests he read Julian Simon's "Research Methods" 
(1978). 
Research methods employed in the thesis consist 
primarily of a descriptive analysis. Classification analysis 
is used in the study of terrorism. Comparative analysis is 
used in the author's attempt to draw explanations from chap-
ters two and four of this study to give weight to his hypothe-
sis. 
11 
Organization of the study 
Chapter two gives an account of the historical 
background in the areas of politics and the economy of Argen-
tina. Chapter three accounts the ruling junta's economic 
performance (1976-79), Chapter four analyzes the type of 
setting (milieu) the Videla regime inherited and presents 
some idea on the scale to which the politics of repression is 
employed in Argentina. A conclusion is then drawn from the 
synthesis of preceeding chapters. 
Appendices are included preceeding the lists of 
selected bibliography. 

ARGENTINA TODAY 
Today Argentina is modern and wealthy. If one had 
any doubt about this statement, one only has to consult sur-
veys conducted on this country put out by such publications 
as The Economist (26 Jan, 1980), L'expansion (18 juil./ 4 
sept. 1980) --to name a few. After all, why should it not be 
so? Argentina is the seventh biggest nation in the world and 
it has only 26 million inhabitants to share its riches. It 
has a mild, pleasant climate. Its heart, the humid pampas, 
is rated as one of the five richest agricultural areas in the 
world, Argentina is the second most important oil-producing 
nation in Latin America, after Venezuela. It is one of the 
world's largest grain producers; second largest beef exporter; 
and fourth biggest wine producer. It produces also a large 
variety of manufactured goods and heavy machineries (the above 
information is taken mainly from the Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 
7) . 
In comparison with its neighbors, a large propor-
tion of Argentines are middle-class. Nine tenths of the popu-
lation are literate. Four fifths of the people live in the 
cities --a very high standard for Latin America (World Bank, 
1980: 111 and 149), 
Argentina is abundant in natural resources. It is 
12 
13 
also self-sufficient in crude oil (The Economist, 26 Jan. 
1980: 25). With its new petroleum fields in the Gulf of 
San Jorge, near the Patagonian port of Comodoro Rivadavia,. 
where reserves of 240m barrels have been found, some 530,000 
barrels of oil are being produced annually to satisfy up to 
93% of its domestic demand (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 25), 
The government projected that by 1985, the country will indeed 
be self-sufficient. 
The Argentine natural gas industry is the most 
highly developed in Latin America (The Economist, 26 Jan. 
1980: 25). There are some J85b cubic meters of natural gas 
recently discovered in a vast field in the south western pro-
vince of Neuguen (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 25), The 
main gas field in use now are in the northern, western, and 
southern provinces. An extensive pipeline system links them 
with the industrial centers. 
The most important coal deposits are those of R10 
Turb10, in the province of Santa Cruz. There are 450m tons 
of coal --although only a mere 1,500 tons are mined each year 
(The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 26). 
At the moment 6% of the country's electrical con-
sumption comes from hydro-electrical plants (The Economist, 
26 Jan. 1980: 26). Argentina plans to have 73% of electrical 
energy generate from this source by the end of the century. 
14 
Also supplying the public with electricity are 
nuclear power plants. Two percent of public consumption come 
from these sources (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 26). Accord-
ing to the government, three more plants will be completed 
by 1997. 
There are 11,000 tons of natural uranium in the 
country (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 26). Other natural 
resources such as copper, molybdenum, gold, lead, silver, zinc, 
and barium can be found in large quantities (The Economist, 
26 Jan, 1980: 26). However, much of Argentina's mineral 
wealth still remains to be explored and exploited. 
Yet although Argentina is potentially richer than 
either Canada or Australia, its position in the world in term 
of per capita GNP have sunk from having the 15th highest to 
the 26th (The Economist, 26 Jan, 1980: 4). Many regarded 
Argentina as "one of the world's great failures --a country 
that though endowed with apparently limitless possibilities, 
seems incapable of realizing its potential" (Falcoff & Dolkart, 
197 5: ix). 1 Hence, one can not help but ask, "What went 
wrong?" In this chapter we will explore Argentina's past .. 
1. An Argentine friend of mine offered an explana-
tion as to why Argentina did not develop into one of the world's 
great power. He told me that when God created the world, He 
lavished so much natural wealth on Argentina. Naturally, other 
nations started to complain to God about it. Hence, to redress 
the balance, God sent Argentina the Perons. Indeed, to many 
Argentines, the Per6ns were the cause of the malady they now 
confront. 
HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
15 
Throughout the late 19th century and until 1916, 
Argentina was governed by a loose coalition of conservative 
political elites representing commercial and landowning in-
terests. They formed no truly national political party but 
joined together at elections to preserve control (see eg., 
Falcoff & Dolkart, 1975), In 1916 ~lections the conservative 
monopoly was broken by the Union C1vica Radical (UCR - Radi-
cal Civic Union). 2 The UCR was composed mainly of moderates 
and middle class. The party prevailed until a military coup 
d'etat in 1930. Following this period, Argentina was to 
undergo several cycles of alternating civilian and military 
rule. 
There can be no doubt that in 1940 Argentina was 
not the most advanced of the Latin American nations. In 
general industrial terms or in the terms of every major speci-
fic industry Mexico and Brasil were far ahead (see eg., Rock, 
1975; Villanueva, 1975; Alsogaray, 1980). During the early 
war era, the conservative Argentine landed aristocracy, still 
2, The UCR is the second most important political 
force in Argentina after the peronist movement. Its leader, 
Ricardo Balbin, was a presidential candidate in 1952, 1958 
and twice in 1973, He was never successful, but, at the age 
of 76, his democratic views have given him considerable pres-
tige. 
16 
in control of the Argentine government, had stiffled serious 
study of mineral deposits for fear that the discovery of coal 
and iron in quantity would make heavy industry inevitable and 
hence end the political predominance of the Argentine land-
owning class. For fundamentally the same reason, the land-
owning government was not too enthusiastic in putting the 
wartime Pinedo Plan for planned industrialization for fear 
that it would result in a lessened dependence on agricultural 
and foreign trade (see Green, 1971 and especially Rock, 1975: 
lBJ-89). 
The Rise antj. Fall of "El L1der", 1940-1955 
The military revolt of June 194J that overthrew 
the old conservative party signaled the beginning of a shift 
in political power toward the industrial bourgeoisie and the 
industrial and urban working classes. It was at this time 
that Argentina saw the intergration of the nation's poor 
and laboring people, los descamisados (the shirtless ones), 
as active political participants and the emergence of organized 
trade union as a key political force. J Argentina, a leading 
J. Hodges wrote: "(A)ccording to the standard aca-
demic interpretations of peronist support from organized la-
bor, that support derived mainly from a politically naive 
stratum of industrial workers consisting primarily of rural 
immigrants to the new industrial working centers of Cordoba, 
Rosario and the capital city of Buenos Aires. This new working 
class was upwardly mobile, unable to identify with the long 
traditions of struggle of a disciplined and independent working 
17 
democracy of Latin America at the time, subsequently succumbed 
to "an upsurge of messianic populism that would forever alter 
the rules of the political game" (Falcoff and Dolkart, 1975: 
35). 
Throughout 1944 continued among the various socio-
economic factions and within the ruling military junta itself 
a jockeying for positions. By the end of 1944, however, the 
shrewd and opportunistic Colonel Juan Domingo Per6n Sosas had 
emerged as the leading figure both in the junta itself and in 
the national competition for political control. By using the 
4 power of his offices, Peron was able to build a personal 
followings upon a new and powerful coalition of military and 
working class support (footnote J offers some insight to this 
idea). The phenomenon of peronism posed the most serious chal-
lenge yet to the predominance of the old pre-revolutionary 
governing elites. 
J. (cont'd.) class, untouched by Marxist and so-
cialist ideas and, correspondingly, an easy prey of nationalist 
dema,¥;_og~ and massive manipulation by organized political elites 
.. ,Lbu_:y recent studies show that the principal support for 
peronism did not come from the new working class of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers from the interiors. On the contrary, 
the principal support for peronism also derived from the 
highly politicized sectors of the old working class ... In Stu-
dies on the Origins of Peronism, Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos 
Portantiero further show that the internal division within the 
Argentine working class is less significant in accounting for 
peronist support than the unity of organized labor both old and 
new 11 (19761 10). 
4. Peron was the Vice-President of the Republic. 
He also held the cabinet portfolios of both War and Labor. 
18 
By mid-1945, the land-based groups were fighting 
for the survival of their political support and influence. 
The industrial middle class and the prolos (working class), 
particularly organized labor were rapidly gaining political 
power. Juan Peron was to find some of his strongest supporters 
and most useful allies among them. In 1946, Peron became 
President of the Republic. By .this time, the peronist move-
ment had consolidated its majority, increasing it to nearly 
65% in the election of 1951, Peron's political strategy and 
tactics were authoritarian and personalistic. During his ad-
ministration a state of internal war was declared enabling him 
the expansion of the executive power. 
In the field of economics, Peron's policies were 
successful up to 1949 largely because of the prosperity of 
exports during the pre- and post-war era. Soon after, it 
became increasingly difficult to finance imports of vital raw 
materials because of inflation and worsened terms of trade. 
Peron was forced to take a more conservative stand in matters 
such as credit providing to the rural areas, interest rates, 
and wage-price controls. 
After the death of his second wife, Evita, it was 
apparant that Peron could not cope with mounting pressures 
from economic deterioration, labor unrest, and lost of poli-
tical support in all sector of the country. Consequently, 
his two-term in office could not save him. He was ousted by 
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a military coup led by Gen. Eduardo Lonardi and was sent into 
exile (Hodges, 1976: 7-24). 
It is argued that Argentina's economic progress has 
been retarded owing much to distortions stemming from the 
Per5n era (1946-55) and its aftermath (see esp. Thompson, 1978: 
229), 
Era of Political Merry-Go-Round, 1955-1973 
After two months in office, Eduardo Lonardi gave 
way to Gen. Pedro Eugenfo Ararnburu. The latter became presi-
dent in November 1955, The new ruling junta took a fiercely 
anti-peronist stand. It dissolved Peron's party and placed 
the Confederaci6n General de+ Trab~jo (CGT -General Labor 
Confederation), an organized union which was the strong sup-
porter of Peron, under state administration (Whitaker, 1975: 
1-JO). But the peronists were able to infiltrate the new 
political structure. In the election of 1957, one fourths 
of the voters heeded their call to cast blank ballots. The 
peronists wielded con~iderable influence on the factions that 
were competing for power. In 1958, they supported Arturo 
Frondizi for President. It was alleged that Frondizi had 
promised to readmit the peronists to political activity in 
return for their supports. Indeed, Frondizi won the presidency. 
But control of important districts, among them the 
province of Grande Buenos Aires, was in the hands of the 
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peronists. Not long after, the military withdrew its support 
from Frondizi. It moved in to dissolve the parliament and 
set up a government in the name of Jose Marfa Guido, president 
pro tempore of the Senate. Guido's 18 month administration 
saw the polarization of the military: los colorados (the red) 
and los azules (the blue). The red sought a dictatorship 
that would deal strongly with the peronists and the extreme 
leftists. The blue, on the other hand, favored a new consti-
tutional government by coalition including the peronists. 
However, the blue wanted to see the peronists confined to a 
relatively weaker role. 
The election of July 1963 resulted in an unexpected 
victory for Arturo Illfa. Once in office, Illfa tried to 
split the resurgent peronists, who were now in control of the 
labor unions, from their exiled leader, Juan Peron. He met 
his waterloo when in June 1966 the peronists supported a 
coup that brought to power Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa. 
The Onganfa regime declared that it was to rule for 
an indefinite period. It was an abvious back-fire for the 
peronists. Ongania further declared that the responsibility 
for change was to be carried out by the military --if neces-
sary by force without the need to seek popular support. With 
the stated objective in m1nd, the Ongania regime moved into 
war against major institutions which had played an important 
role in politics: political parties were abolished; universi-
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ties were "cleansed" of their left-wing and centrist elements. 
The regime ruled by firm hand. 5 
Disturbances arid riots were frequent. The rebellion 
in Cordoba or the so-called el Cordobazo, rose out of student 
and labor alliance against the government's economic policy 
and its "general improverishment of groups outside the oligar-
chic bourgeoisie; the medium and small bourgeoisie, the middle 
sectors, sections of the working class displaced by the growth 
of monopoly capital" (Rock, 1975: 212), Underground activities 
were orchestrated by a Trotskyite group, the Ejercito Revolu-
cionar10 del Pueblo (ERP - People's Revolutionary Army) and 
by peronist groups --among them the Movimiento Peron{sta Mon-
toneros (MPM - Montoneros peronist Movement). In 1970, the 
MPM captured and assassinated former president Aramburu who 
6 
was organizing a movement for a return to constitutional rule. 
This, it is said 7, was the cause for a coup d'etat against 
the Onganfa regime in June 1970. Gen. Roberto Marcelo Leving-
ston became new Argentine president until he was ousted by 
5, In suppressing conventional political activities, 
let us note, the Ongan1a regime had weakened considerably the 
institutional capability to moderate and channel conflict. 
6. The MPM declared that his assassination was a 
reprisal for the massacres he had ordered as head of the govern-
ment in 1956. However, his close associate, Hector Sandler, 
said in an interview that Ongan.5'.a was in fact responsible for 
Aramburu's death (see Latin America Regional Report, 7 March 
1980: 6) . 
7, This view is expressed by various writers cited 
in this paper. 
22 
Gen. Alejandro Lanusse a year later. 
The Lanusse regime was the third military regime 
since 1966. It announced immedia~ely for the restoration of 
representative democracy and set scheduled for presidential 
elections which was to be held in March 1973. The regime also 
called upon various political parties to join it in its attempts 
to save the nation from revolutionary anarchy. Lanusse was 
counting on the peronists to join him in this project of 
reviving the traditional structures in the hope of using them 
as a buffer between the regime and the forces of popular un-
rest. 
The Return of "El L1der" 
After 1971, the peronist movement regained much of 
its middle class support from the small entrepreneur groups in 
the Confederaci6n General de la Economfa (CGE - General Econo-
mic Confederation) and other associations (Rock, 1975: 217). 
Students and other lower middle class groups had evolved into 
, 
a new left-wing of the movement --the Juventud Peronista 
(JP - Peronist Youth). From this point onward, the battle for 
popular support, which a priori were fought between the stu-
dents and the radical unions, now became transposed into an 
internal struggle within the party itself: between the JP; 
old middle class remnants of peronism; and the CGT bureaucracy 
(see eg., Rock, 1975 and Hodges, 1976). The CGT had at this 
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time opted for a moderate line while the JP, essentially 
middle class, attempted to commit the party to a socialist 
position with strong emphasis on nationalism and anti-
imperialism (see among others, Rock, 1975; Hodges, 1976). 
In the meantime, Lanusse launched the Grande 
Acuerdo Nacional (Great National Agreement) 8 --a program 
aimed at bringing peronism into the political scenario as a 
means to prop up conservative order (Rock, 1975: 217), He 
hoped to regenerate Argentina's capitalist structure by pro-
moting political consensus rather than through military dicta-
torship (Rock, 1975: 217), The ERP answered back by issuing 
a statement that "the figure of Peron constitutes at present 
the last means of escape for the Argentine bourgeoisie, and 
in this sense it is counter-revolutionary" (Rock, 1975: 217), 
In fact, Pertn himself was also bidding for power. He main-
tained formal alliance with the non-peronist movement in the 
hope of using them to form a strong foundation for his poli-
tical power. The military, however, barred Peron presidential 
candidature. 9 It accepted, instead, Peron's pliant protege, 
8. The Great National Agreement was a plan launched 
by Lanusse in 1971 in which he urged for the establishment of a 
single coalition all sectors of the population --both those 
which had and had not participated in the political processes 
since the outlawing of Per6n 1 s party in 1955, This front was 
to include the traditional right, the representatives of busi-
ness both large and small, sectors of the labor bureaucracy 
and the military. 
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Dr. Hector J, Campora who later became president in May 197J, 
Under C~pora's administration the left-wing peronists were 
able to consolidate its grip on the JP and gained considerable 
influence. It was Per6n 1 s return to Argentina in June that 
year that occassioned the "Ezeiza Massacre" where more a thou-
sand peo~le died --fighting for what they believed to be the 
true peronist way (Gente, 1979), l-0 
The nationalist Montoneros, being disillusioned 
, 
with Peron, had by May 197J now become a quasi-Castroist outfit 
and joined with local Marxist group (see Hodges, 1976: esp, 
chps. 2 & J). Violence mounted progressively from the left 
9, Hodges explained, "Per6n was unacceptable as a 
candidate to the military government. Anticipating that any 
popular front with Per6n on its ticket would carry the elec-
tions scheduled for March 1973, Lanusse announced on July 9, 
1972 the adoption of a residential clause prohibiting any per-
son from running for public office who had not established 
his residence in Argentina prior to August 25, 1972, Per6n 
was unable to comply with this new restriction. He could not 
return safely until Lanusse chose to annul the charge against 
him as a 'traitor' pending before military tribunal since 1955, 
nor could he return legally without proper documents and the 
government's authorization" (1976: 59). 
10. While in exiled, Per6n made use of his followers. 
There were, in fact, two factions in the movement: the left 
and the right. The former, consisted of urban guerilla known 
as the MPM, Peron called them his "special formation" (Timer-
man, 1981: 44). While on the right saw the emergence of a 
mysterious "AAA" or the Alianza Ant1comunrsta Ar entina (Argen-
tine Anti-Communist Alliance . Not to be confused with the 
Argentine Automobile Association, the "AAA" was an organization 
vowed to "cleanse" the party of Marxist elements. It was 
headed by Jos~ L6pez Rega, Peron's confidence. He financed 
the "AAA" with fund from his Ministry of Social Welfare (Fer-
nandez, 1976: 76). Obviously, the break was inevitable. 
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to the right of the political spectrum as they struggled for 
power under different political objectives and conceptions. 
Both the right-wing and the left-wing of peronism were engaged 
in acts of terrorism which had taken on broad dimensions: 
bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations for poli-
tical purposes were not uncommon occurrences. As the situation 
deteriorated further, Peron withdrew his support from C~mpora. 
The latter resigned on lJ July 1973, 11 
It was at this time that the conservatives and the 
right-wingers came to the conclusion that only Peron had the 
political ability and strength to bar the way forward to the 
12 
extremist groups. Hence, they supported him in the up-
coming election in which Peron ran on a ticket that included 
his third wife, Mar.1a Estela Martfne z -- better knovm as "Isa-
~ belita"-- as vice-president. The election resulted in a vic-
tory for the Perons. They took office in October 1973, 
Peron continued his campaign ar~ainst the left, the 
Marxist guerilla groups, and other extremist groups with re-
newed intensity. Many of his followers denounced him and 
11. C~mpora was not able to resist pressures from 
the peronist political and trade union leaderships (Hodges, 
1976: 78-9), 
12. The ERP issued a statement warning that, "if 
peronism accepts the political game imposed from outside and 
tailored according to the needs of the dominant neo-bourgeoi-
sie it will weakened forever its capacity to become the prin-
cipal instrument of the National Revolution" (Rock, 1975: 
218). . 
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passed into opposition. 
But the seventy-eight years old Peron could not 
stopped the violence. According to Senor Marcelo Lugones, 
an Argentine publisher, whom I interviewed, Per6n never had 
the intention of stopping the violence. "It was Peron's last 
assault on the country he so hated." 13 
Less than a year later, Peron died of a heart 
attack. His wife and constitutional successor, Isabel1ta 
became the new president while the situation deteriorated fur-
ther especially in terms of the economy and violence. 
13, Marcelo Lugones is a friend of the Lanusse family. 
His comment is based upon his reflections of the peronist years. 

THE ECONOIVJY 
Traditionally, Argentines enjoyed relatively equal 
distribution of income (Department of State, 1981: JJ4). In 
recent years, however, it has been less equal as a result, in 
part, of the Videla administration's policies designed to re-
duce inflation and to revitalize the country's productive 
sector. 
Inflation 
Spiralling inflation has been the central economic 
problem confronting Argentina throughout the 60s, the ?Os, and 
into the 80s. It is said that inflation was the result of the 
increase in government spendings during the Per6n years. 1 
1. The Argentine peso "which stood at 5 to the 
dollar in 1955, underwent series of devaluations until in 1970 
its parity was 400 to the dollar. The cost of living in Bue-
nos Aires rose from a base of 100 in 194J to 680 in 1955. 
Later estimates using 1960 as the base year placed the level 
at nearly 700 in 1970 (with corresponding index number of J 
for 194J and 20 for 1955), This means that 700 pesos had 
approximately the same purchasing power in 1970 that J pesos 
had in 194J" (THD in Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1979: 1140). 
Also must be taken into account is the fact that 
the peronist government was largely depended on organized labor, 
hence, it was unable and unwilling to resist union wage demands 
(Jordan, 1977: 57), The rate of inflation in 1975 rose to 
JJ4.B% (Jordan, 1977: 57). The state's deficit was 408% above 
that of 1974 (Jordan, 1977: 57), A massive devaluation pro-
gram was attempted. This attempt and other subsequent programs 
to correct "the strong imbalances in relative prices .. ,.[and 
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The decline in real wages has had serious effect on 
the standard of living of the majority of the Argentines. In 
1976, the consumption of food dropped by 40% and purchases of 
clothing by 50% reflecting the JOO% rise in the price of clo-
thing (Department of State, 1980a: 26). 2 Official estimate 
is that there has been a 60% decline in the purchasing power 
of wages (Department of State, 1980a: 26). 
Inflation brought with it harsh social consequences. 
Price incrases more rapidly than income can adjust to. Econo-
mic efforts designed to control inflation have imposed severe 
hardships on the poor who lived on a maladjusted social secu-
rity benefits and the middle class with savings. The private 
sector also suffered, Big companies are relying more upon 
borrowings from abroad rather than confronting with the high 
interest rates and risks on foreign exchange at home. Pri-
vately owned companies are reluctant to borrow, to raise capi-
1, (cont'd.) to reduc..§7 the real income of those 
labor sectors /y;ere met with failures which7 ... led to increase 
disharmony in a continuously worsening situation" (OAS, 1979: 
2). There was also the problem of unemployment --which was 
largely disguised by massive increase in the bureaucracy (Jor-
dan, 1977: 58). Argentina saw the populist formula regime 
for economic catastrophe and disorder: inflation plus dis-
guised unemployment undermining saving and capital formation, 
debasing the currency through printing, and circulating more 
money than justified by tax revenues --hence, destroying the 
country's financial system and its financial reserves. 
2, In 1980, the monthly rate of inflation dropped 
sharply during the final quarter of the year. It expanded at 
the rate of 8J% compared with a rate 174% during the first 8 
months of 1979, These figures reflect the consumer price 
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tal, or to launch new ventures. Directly hit are small ~nd 
medium sized companies which are often trapped between rising 
opportunity costs and a fickle market (see The Economist, 26 
Jan. 1980: 22). 
When the private sector fails to invest, the govern-
ment feels ogligated to do so. The Videla administration's 
share of the GNP in 1980 was 37% (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 
22), In 1979, the government announced that it had reduced 
public employment by 100,000 but the state still continues to 
account for about 50% of total investment (The Economist, 26 
Jan, 1980: 22), The results, hence, are of two-fold: first, 
it adds to the state deficit; second, it keeps inflation 
surging ahead, The vicious circle becomes nearly impossible 
to break, 
In 1976, after the coup d'6tat, Videla and his 
government seeked the imposition of wage controls, Real earn-
ing was cut by a third (Smith, 1980: 85), Real wages have 
fallen rapidly due to the fact that the cost of living index 
to which wages are tied to does not reflect the full impact 
of price increases on a working class family. Since wages 
are indexed to the cost of living only every three months, it 
2, (cont'd,) index. The wholesale price showed 
astonishing stability, with an annual rate of increase of less 
t~an 50% durin~ the last quarter (Latin America Regional Re-
view, 1980a: 1), 
JO 
seems obvious that living standard would decline during the 
waiting period. 
Although the government has now freed wages in the 
private sector, wages are supposed to rise only if there is 
an increase in productivity (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 22). 
In the public sector, however, wages are still under control. 
~ According to Dr. Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Minister of 
Economy, the distortion in the national economy of the 1970s 
was the results of three main causes: 
... the inefficiency of an industrial sector 
protected by excessive tariffs; the persistence of 
demagogic policies that kept wages artificially high; 
and discrimination against the rural sector, notwith-
standing Argentina's comparative advantage in the J 
production of cereals and meat (Smith, 1980: 65). 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
High tariffs and import-substitution were the cor-
nerstone of Argentina's post-war efforts at industrialization 
under Gen. Juan Domingo Per6n. Foreign investment was largely 
discourage. In effect, Per6n set up one of the world's least 
efficient industrial bases behind tariff wall, He had also 
J. In his correspondance to me, Dr. Peter H. Smith, 
the Head of the Dept. of Humanities at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, commented, "(T)he statement ... refers not to 
objective reality about wage prices, but to perceptions of the 
Martinez de Hoz team --with specific reference to wage prices 
during the Peron regime. (t)he Martfnez de Hoz group appa-
rantly sees this as a necessary corrective for the 'demagogic' 
Jl 
pioneered the xenophobic feelings in the Argentines: the 
anti-British and anti-American nationalism. The result had 
been a climate of instability in which neither foreigners nor 
Argentines themselves would invest to put the country's easy 
going industries on the go, or would they even attempt to 
unlatch the country's vault of untapped agricultural, energy, 
and mineral resources. 4 
, 
When Alfredo Martinez de Hoz took office as the 
Minister of Economy in March 1976, he announced that tariffs 
would be dismantled and foreign investment would be encouraged. 
Many admit now that it did not seem possible at the time, but 
Martinez de Hoz had proven that it could be done --even when 
taking into account special interests that must be accommo-
dated and Argentina's inefficient industries: steel, chemicals, 
automobiles, electronics which were reluctant to permit foreign 
competition. 
, 
But Martinez de Hoz did succeed in carrying out 
his program for free trade (see eg., Smith, 1980; The Econo-
mist, 26 Jan. 1980). 
Recently, Argentina was able to enjoy balance of 
J. (cont'd.) policies in previous periods, e~e-
cially the era of Per~n. They also believed that the Campora-
Peron administration prompted a return to pro-labor policies." 
4. In 1939, the British owned 2/J of foreign 
assets in the country. Foreign investment had greatly been 
upset by Peron's programs. This could be said to be one of 
the causes of the retardation of the Argentine economy 
(see eg., Randall, 1978). 
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payments surplus. Thanks to its beef export, a deficit of 
US$ 1,3b in 1975 was transformed into a surplus of US$ 650m 
in 1976, US$ 1,3b in 1977 and US$ 2b in 1978 (The Economist, 
26 Jan. 1980: 20). Beef, the mainstay of Argentina's pros-
perity, had been ignored under the peronist administration 
(1973-76). Price control imposed by the peronist administra-
tion gave the farmers and ranchers only half the money they 
could have otherwise fetch on world markets. By freeing the 
control, the government had, in effect, increased production 
to 16.5m head of cattle as opposed to lOm in 1973 (The Econo-
mist, 26 Jan. 1980: 20). 
Since 1976i exports of goods have increased signifi-
cantly. In its economic review of Argentina, the Organization 
of the American States (1979b) points out that by 1978 exports 
of goods were more than double their 1975 value in nominal 
terms (p, 17), In particular, the response of the agricultu-
ral sector to new incentives and policies was especially posi-
tive, added to which favorable weather conditions allowed re-
cord harvests of several crops, resulting in 32.2 and 44.3 
percents increased in sales abroad in 1976 and 1977 respec-
tively (OAS, 1979b: 17), 5 
5. Among the first actions taken by the new econo-
mic authorities in 1976 was to negotiate a stand-by credit of 
US$ 300m with the IMF and, subsequently, to obtain financial 
support of almost US$ lb from a group of private banks in the 
US, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. These actions made it 
JJ 
The government has also been encouraging foreign 
investment. A decree was passed in March 1977 allowing 
foreign investors the remittance of all their profits home. 
However, there is a small tax on capital remittance of more 
than 12% (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 20). Big investments, 
nonetheless, will be needed in the country. Thus far, the 
gap has yet to be filled --one of the biggest deterrents to 
investments is inflation. 
In comparison to other sectors of the economy, the 
foreign sector has experienced the greatest and most rapid 
recovery from crisis it faced in 1975 and early 1976. Posi-
tive results have been accomplished in the balance of payments 
as a whole, especially in exports, capital inflows, and the 
level of net international reserves. 6 
ASSESSWiliNTS 
Today Argentina enjoys a high standard of living. 
5. (cont'd,) possible for the government to meet 
short-term external commitments by renegotiating a part of this 
debt and converting it into obligations maturing in four years 
or more (OAS, 1979b: 18). The guidelines issued by the economic 
authorities on the foreign sector have been aimed at promoting 
exports, decontrolling imports and attracting long-term offi-
cial and private capital. In this respect, since April 1976, 
the measures adopted have tended to reduce taxes on major 
policy that would take into account changes in purchasing 
power between Argentina and its major trading partners (OAS, 
1979b: 18). 
6. In l975, mainly due to the drop of nearly US$ lb 
in exports of goods, the nation' net international reserves 
J4 
In 1979, per capita income in current dollars was an estimated 
US$ J,400 (Department of State, 1981: JJJ). The Argentine 
government have, within the economic constraints of recent 
years, sought to confront social needs (Department of State, 
1981: JJJ). Of total central government spendings in 1979, 
10.1% went to education, J% to public health, and 4,5% to 
housing (Department of State, 1981: JJJ). Infant mortality 
for the period of 1970-79 was 59 per 1,000 births (Department 
of State, 1981: JJJ). Life expectancy is 69.4 years (Depart-
ment of State, 1981: JJJ). There is one physician for every 
5JO persons; a hospital bed for every 170 (Department of State, 
1981: JJJ). In 1978, 94% of the adult population was literate 
(Department of State, 1981: JJ4). To date, attempts have been 
made by the government to keep up with swelling ranks of grow-
ing unemployed. Official unemployment in Argentina was 2% in 
1980, "although some observers believe that there is some 
hidden unemployment" (Department of State, 1981: JJ4) (see 
also footnote 1), 
No doubt, the economy is in a period of reduced 
growth. Inflation is running about 90% for 1980 (Department 
of State, 1981: JJ4). Nevertheless, it is declining. The 
government's objectives are to maintain full employment and 
6. (cont'd.) declined by US$ 791m (OAS, 1979b: 17), 
J6 
monthly price changes have been somewhat erratic on many 
occassions, the inflationary process has presented formidable 
challenge to the anti-inflationary measures adopted by the 
government. 7 
Monetary and credit policy was one of the leading 
instruments in combating inflation. By gradually eliminating 
the Central Bank's financing of the fiscal deficit, the eco-
nomic team attempted to curtail the growth of the money supply 
in excess of private sector demand in order to curb existing 
inflationary pressures. On the supply-side, the policy stressed 
the close-monitoring of factors that tended to expand the sup-
ply of money and credit (see OAS, 1979b). To meet the objec-
7. A review of the major macroeconomic variables 
for the period 1974-78 reveals that no single real or monetary 
variable shows a consistent correlation with the inflation 
rate throughout the period (OAS, 1979b: JJ). In the first 
two years of the period, the determinants of the inflation 
seem to have been the major increases in public spending fi-
nanced more and more heavily by the Central Bank in money 
issue and the expansion of the money supply (OAS, 1979b: JJ). 
This coupled with a steep growth in nominal salaries caused 
a short-run spurt in domestic putput, as producers sought to 
satisfy growing demand (OAS, 1979b: JJ). Shortly afterwards, 
inflation accelerated sharply and consequently there was short 
supply and growing unsatisfied demand (OAS, 1979b: JJ). 
The significant drop in the rate of domestic inflation 
during the second-half of the 1976 was achieved by measures 
adopted by the economic authorities. These measures were aimed 
at bringing down fiscal deficit, improving the public finance 
situation in the balance of payments. The actions lowered 
the high expectations of inflation and the stron~ drop in real 
wages relieved the pressure on aggregate demand (OAS, 1979b: 
22-35), 
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tive, a more liberal interest rate policy was adopted to, 
encourage the public to hold on to financial assets (OAS, 
1979b: 33), Supposedly, the higher interest rates would re-
sult in higher yields on financial assets and thereby allowed 
the elimination of credit subsidies and contribute to a signi-
ficant growth in total savings rate (OAS, 1979b: 34). But 
higher interest rates attract foreign speculative credit and 
capital which have expansionary effects on the moneJ supply 
(The Economi~t, 25 October 1980 and OAS, 1979b: J4). Contra-
ry to government's expectations, this made domestic business 
credit more expensive since the national financial system was 
still able to pass on to its users any charge in its marketing 
or profit levels (OAS, 1979b: J4). 
Briefly, the most significant events in the monetary 
and credit areas since 1976 were: the reform of the financial 
system in mid-1977; the establishment of the currency regula-
tion account; significant changes in the factors behind the 
money supply; and, rise in both private credit and interest 
rates (OAS, 1979b: 27), Argentine's monetarist Cassandra, 
Alvaro Alsogaray pinned inflation down as being nurtured, 
"exclusively by the creation of money supply at a rate which 
has no relationship with the goods produced or with the public's 
desire to hang on to it" (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 19), 
: "-

THE FALL OF ISABELITA 
By 1969 political violence in Argentina had given 
rise to terrorism on broad dimensions with organized terro-
rist groups on the left and the right of the political spec-
trum numbering somewhere in the neighborhood of five to six 
thousand persons, with an additional fifteen thousand sympa-
thizers (Department of State, 1980: 241). Consequently, both 
civilian and military governments have maintained an estado 
de emergencia (state-of-siege) for nine of the past ten years. 1 
By 1975 the government of Isabel Peron had gone 
through ten cabinet changes and four aborted economic plans 2 
under four different ministers of economics (see eg., Fernan-
dez, 1976; Jordan, 1977), The end to the galloping inflation, 
however, was nowhere in sight. Mounting labor tensions coupled 
with problem of financial corruptions within the government 
put tremendous pressures on the peronist government. 
1. Since 1955 there have been six military and 
six civilian presidents. 
2, Among them: Ber Gelbard' act of national compro-
mise, Gomez Morales' monetarism, the shock treatement recom-
mended by the IMF applied by Clestfno Rodr.:i'.'go, and the modi-
fied monetarism and revived social pact of Antonio Caf{ero. 
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The basic underlying conditions of the fall of 
Isabel Peron were to be found: first, in the political crisis 
and division within the peronists; and, second, in the peron-
ist mismanagment of the economy which became evident in the 
runaway inflation and negative growth rate during the 1975s 
(see eg., Fernandez, 1976; Jordan, 1977; Hodges, 1976). The 
economic crisis compounded with political crisis resulted in 
Isabel Per6n's inability to rule effectively. In effect, she 
confronted not only a weak and unstable government, a rapidly 
decaying economy, but also an escalation of political violence. 
Indeed, the peronist government was blamed for a deteriorating 
political situation that was providing sustenance not only 
to the guerillas but also to a generalized climate of mass 
subversion. 
The military certainly did not want the situation to 
deteriorate any further. But the question was how to inter-
vene successfully against a government which had received more 
than sixty percent of popular votes representing the first 
clear-cut majority in eighteen years of past interventions 
that had ended in a blind alley for the military (Fernandez, 
1976; Jordan, 1977), Hence, it chose to intervene by quotas 
and to wait for a political crisis to develop before making 
a decisive move. By the late-1975, Argentina was a country 
of an unusual paradox. The government that received an over-
whelming mandate from the people was rapidly losing all sup-
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port (Fernandez, 1976: 86). It was the military' oppor~unity 
to intervene. 
The present Argentine military junta came into 
power on 24 March 1976. 3 Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael 
Videla became the tenth General-President imposed upon the 
Argentines v!a a coup d'~tat. 4 Upon assuming power the 
junta disposed of all democratic institutions. 5 But while 
most political parties are banned, they continue to exist in 
one form or another. There have, however, been attempts to 
establish dialogue between the military and leaders of these 
political parties. Under the present condition, the following 
groups seem to carry some weight in influencing governmental 
decisions: 
1) the Union Civica Radical (UCR) under Ricardo 
3. Presently, Argentina is governed by a new junta 
headed by Gen. Roberto Eduardo Viola. 
4. The first in 1930 was Gen. Jose Felfx Uriburu. 
In 1943, Arturo Rawson, Pedro Pablo Ramferez, and Edelmira 
J, Farrel were put into power bI different military juntas. 
Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Eugenfo.Aramburu became presidents 
consecutively in 1955, In 1966 Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa, 
Roberto Marcelo Levingston, Alejandro A. Lanusse assumed the 
executive office. Videla is the tenth. In 1980, Gen. Viola 
became the eleventh. 
5, The National Congress, provincial legislatures 
and municipal councils were dissolved. The power of all civi-
lian authorities and elected officials were abrogated. All 
political parties were suspended. All political activity was 
declared illegal, The members of the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts were removed and the judiaciary was replaced by 
military tribunals. Trade union activity was outlawed. The 
military, in effect, rules by decee. 
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Balbin clamor for a return to democratic principles. 
The UCR apparantly is hoping to pick up labor support 
after the junta has finished with the peronists. 
2) the conservatives and the developmentalists 
seek power through relatively close collaboration with 
the government. 
3) the peronist opposition survive within the labor 
movement, but it is divided. There are two principal 
labor organizations: the Comission Nacional de Trabais2. 
(CNT - National Labor Commission), a conglomerate of 
generally uncommitted and pragmatic unions that includes 
the immmensely powerful metal workers union; and the 
Veingte y Cinco (25), a coalition of five separate fac-
tions, three of which are peronists (Latin America Re-
gional Reports, 23 May 1980: 7; Latin America Regional 
Reports, 1 February 1980: 6; Smith, 1980: 63). 
Attempts to unify the CNT and the 25 as a cohesive 
trade union movement have thus far met without success 
(Smith, 1980: 63). Moreover, the junta passed a decree on 
labor organizations on 16 November 1979, It was a measure 
designed to ban all unions from political activity (Smith, 
1980: 63). This measure, in effect, undermined the institu-
tional strength of the unions for the law diluted their ac-
cess to funds and took away their control of the social ser-
vices. Here is the paradox, the union themselves were show-
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ing signs of vitality and strength. Further, in their 
reaction to the junta, workers have frequently heeded to unions' 
calls to take part in clandestine operations: slowdowns, stop-
pages, and sabotage (Smith, 1980: 63), Hence, although the 
unions have lost a great piece of their share of the pie, 
they are still a major national force. 
On the other hand, the ruling coalition is split 
between two factions: los duros (the hardliners), who want 
to extend the repression by means of an ideological war of 
national purification; los blandos (the moderates), who advo-
6 
cate accommodation with political and social forces. The 
principal leaders of the hardliners are Gen. Carlos Suarez 
Mason, army chief-of-staff, Gen. Iberico Saint Jean, governor 
of Buenos Aires, and Gen. Luciano Benjamin Menedez, former 
commander of the third army crops in Cordoba (see also Smith, 
1980: 64; Latin America Regional Reports, 1 February 1980: 
6; The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 11-12). The moderates are 
headed by Gen. Videla and Gen. Viola. They are the people 
in power now in Argentina. 
TERRORISM 
Terrorism is an old tradition in Latin America. 
6. Some of these conditions, the readers will 
notice, are quite similar to those mentioned in Chp. 2: 20-
23), 
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It was employed by political bandits and hired assassins. 
It occurred during the wars of liberation as well as in civil 
wars (see eg., Alexander, 1976). For our purpose, we shall 
categorize ''terrorism" into two groups: the establishment 
terrorism (government); the revolutionary terrorism (urban 
guerilla). 
Many political researchers have agreed that terro-
rism on both sides of the political spectrum in Argentina 
stemmed from a reformist-populist mass movement with which 
many Argentines identified: peronism (see eg., Poutet, 1978; 
Gabetta, 1979; Butler, 1976). Although there are ideological 
differences in these groups, most of them traced their origins 
, 
to Peron. 
During the underground years, the special units 
had gradually adopted the methods of their leftist comrades, 
as well as their political convictions (see Butler, 1976). 
The nationalist Montoneros, the followers of Per6n, later 
became a quasi-Castro-Guevarist outfit and joined with the 
local Marxist groups. The deployment of the establishment 
terrorism was started, with Pertn•s approval, by the Minister 
of Welfare, Jost Lopez Rega, with the objective to "cleanse" 
the peronist movement of Marxist elements. 7 But Per6n had 
7. 
establishment 
but that with 
See also chp, 
This is not to say the deployment of the 
terrorism did not·started before this period, 
massive scale it was started duririg this time. 
2. 
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made use of both factions of terrorism. The day of his return 
to Argentina saw bloody battles among hostile factions of his 
followers which resulted in hundreds of casualties in an epi-
sode of the "Ezeiza Massacre 11 (Gente, 1979), 
It was after the resignation of Campora, many saw 
, 
Peron as the "saviour" who could end the unabated political 
violence that nearly caused a civil war. When he became pre-
sident, Peron could not stop the violence. His harsh words 
were to later antagonized much of his left-leaning fellowers. 
They, in turn, vowed to overthrow his government (see also 
chapter two). 
Capitalist of Terror 
Anywhere else in the world, terrorists would have to 
work hard to make money. This is not the case of Argentina's 
Ejercito Revolucionar10 del Pueblo (ERP), The ERP started out 
robbing banks but later found a more lucrative method of earn-
ing money --kidnapping. Or to put it more politely, the ERP 
concentrated its effort on "expropriation" (Dobson and Payne, 
1979: 90). 
The kidnappings fulfilled three functions: first, 
they brought in a great deal of money; second, they enabled 
the ERP to maintain a correct radical approach; and third, 
they pleased the xenophobic Argentines by attacking foreign 
concerns and foreign officials (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 90). 
, . 
Mario Santucho was the head of the ERP. His group had claimed 
"credit" for assassinating Abel R. Agarotti, the commander of 
the national police; Oberdan Sallustro, the Argentine head of 
Fiat; Gen. Juan Carlos Sanchez, and many other (see Dobson & 
Payne, 1979 and the appendices at the er:i.d of this thesis). 
Holder of a doctorate degree in Economics, Santucho, leader of 
this Troskyite guerilla group, subscribed to the theories of 
another Argentine, namely, Ernesto "Che" Guevara (Fernandez, 
1976: 76). Santucho was also inspired by the liberation of 
the Vietnamese people (Fernandez, 1976: 76). On 20 July 1976, 
Santucho was killed in a scrimmage with security forces. It 
is now believed that the ERP has lost much of its fighting 
capacity, particularly in Tucuman, although cases of kidnappings 
and assassinations have been reported (Fernandez, 1976: 76). 
The revolutionary cadres within the Juventud peron-
ista (JP) in direct response to the Cordobazo gave rise to 
the guerilla organization called "Montoneros". 8 The Monto-
neros are followers of a leftist-peronist philosophy. For 
Juan Pertn, they were his ;'special formation" (T imerman, 1981: 
4J), But the struggle between the Montoneros and the right-
wing faction of peronist movement prompted the former into 
armed resistance against the very government it helped put 
to power. 
8. Montoneros were name of the gaucho contigents 
of Argentina's first War of Independence in 1810 and of the 
civil wars that followed (Hodges, 1976: 5J). 
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The Montoneros too financed their activities through 
"expropriation". Supposedly, they also found a way to make 
their money grow --they put the ransomed money that theJ had 
collected into internation financial institutes through David 
Graiver, and Argentine business tycoon (Dobson & Payne, 1979: 
92). 9 
Establishment ·Terrorism 
Already before the coup led by Gen. Videla, the 
deployment of the establishment terrorism had been in practice. 
One of the most important groups in this category was the 
11 AAA 11 which was given a carte blanche to carry out, with minimal 
public attention or centralized coordination, the so-called 
"dirty war" against subversion. The practice continues. 
Former Argentine Foreign Minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guz-
zetti, denied this --although his statement was itself a para-
dox: 
There is no right wing subversion or terrorism 
as such. The body of society is affected by a disease 
that corrodes its entrails and forms anti-bodies. 
These anti-bodies can not be regarded in the same wa:1 
as the microbe itself. The action of the anti-body 
will disappear as the government controls and destroys 
the guerilla (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1979: 
135), 
9, Graiver died in a plane crash. The government 
is looking into the case of the conspiracy between the Monto-
neros and the Graiver Empire. But "in April 1978 Robert Mor-
genthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, declared that 'there 
is a basis to believe L_'Graive!] is still alive" (Dobson & 
Payne, 1979: 95), No one, however, knows where the moneJ is. 
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Few weeks after the fall of Isabel Peron, Jacobo 
Timerman, a·former editor and publisher of La Opinion, met 
with several officers of the Argentine navy for lunch. He 
recalled the meeting (Timerman: 1981: 48-9), It was discovered 
forty-eight hours earlier that the food which was to be served 
to certain high-ranking officers had been poisoned. Hence, 
the conversation centered around the question of what to do 
with terrorism of the left. Timerman was asked what he would 
have done if the guilty party was arrested. Timerman said that 
he would have submitted the case to military tribunal and would 
then invite journalists and foreign jurists to attend. By 
using legal methods to curb violence, Timerman reasoned, would 
eliminate one of the major elements exploited by subversion 
--the illegal nature of repression. 
"But Timerman, don't you understand that 
applying legal methods is equivalent to the death 
sentence? 11 
"I know. It's hard, but it's acceptable." 
"So you'd be willing to accept the death 
sentence for these people?" 
"Yes, I'd accept it. I do accept it." 
"Fine. Well, you can be happy --they've alreadJ 
been executed ... 
If we exterminate them all there will be fear 
for several generations" (Timerman, 1981: 49). 
Robert Harvey, a journalist of the Economist, offers 
some insight on the situation in Argentina today: 
... the use of official terrorism to counter ordinary 
terrorism made Argentina a more dangerous place than 
Chile after the coup because the rules of the game, 
for the government's critic, were so ill-defined. A 
journalist,. for example, might be given a wink by a 
minister t6 go ahead and publish an article criti-
zing an aspect of government policy. But he would 
not know whether a security service belonging to 
the army, or the air force, or the navy, or local 
military governor, or provincial governor, or in-
dependent of any of these, would or would not take 
umbrage. And even a top minister might be unable 
to help him if he was whisked off by a group of 
unknown men one night (The Economist, 26 Jan. 1980: 
lJ). 
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Indeed from the Argentine government's point of 
view, the problem of terrorism is highly complex. Moreover, 
as Harvey pointed out, the government may, in fact, unable 
to control the killings and kidnappings by the securi t:r forces. 
THE DIS APPEARED 
My name is Oscar Alfredo Gonzalez. I was born 
in La Plata ... I am married and have a six-year-old 
son. I worked in the SIAP factory in the above city, 
where I was an active member of the union, From the 
time of the coup on 24 March 1976, I became more po-
litically active. 
In 1976 the army forced their wg:1 into my 
parents' house on two occasions .{si.Q/· On 2 November 
1977 I was kidnapped by a group from the Navy in 
Buenos Aires, Federal Capital, I was tortured. 
My new name was X-51, 
On 6 December of the same year my wife, Estela 
Maria Pereiro, was kidnapped and taken to the con-
centration camp Club Atl~tico. She had never taken 
part in any political activities. In January 1978 
Navy personnel told me that they were going to re-
lease her [si.Q7, I never heard any more from her. 
I was kept prisoner for 15 months, first by the 
Navy (TF J) and then by the First Army Corps (STF). 
I soon realized that they were going to kill me and 
I therefore started looking for·a chance to escape 
(Amnesty International, 1980: 47). 10 
10, This is only one example reported to the AI. 
Relatively new and broughtforth increasing concerned 
by many are disappearances of persons resulting from officially 
sanctioned political kidnappings. The term itself has become 
a euphemism for political murder, precede by intensive inter-
rogation and torture of those who are not charged with any 
specific crime. Amnesty International explained: 
Since the coup d'etat of March 1976 the most 
horrifying aspect of the repression has been the 
number of los desaparecidos --the disappeared. In 
February 1979 the Buenos Aires Herald estimated that, 
over the previous three years, there had been an 
average of between J to 10 kidnappings a day. The 
government denies all knowledge of the disappeared 
or that they have been detained. Three times in 
1978 the government published lists of people who, 
it claimed, were thought to be missing but had 
since been found (12 April- 232, 7 August- 201, 
14 December- 159), No names on these lists corres-
ponded with those known to Amnesty International 
( 1980': 47). 
There are also large numbers of persons held by the 
disposal of the Foder Ejecutivo Nacional (PEN - National Exe-
cutive Power), a decree signed by the president which does 
not specify the nature of the crime which justifies imprison-
ment. Most of the prisoners under this decree have been held 
for two to three years, but there are some who have been in 
11 preventive detention for more than four years. According 
11, Under the terms of article 2J of the Argentine 
Constitution --Derecho de Opci6n (Right of Option) prisoners 
held at the disposal of the PEN are entitled to leave the 
country. However, very few applications have been granted 
this right. The US State Department have also declared that 
the government of Argentina has refused a large numbers of 
option requests submitted by detainees to whom it has issued 
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to the Review of Human Rights in Latin America, there are 
approximately 1, JOO persons being held under this categor:1 
(Department of State, 1980: J). 
Amnesty International divides the disappeared into 
four categories: 
those released after a short time (from one to JO days) 
--the largest category; those murdered; those who are 
transferred to official prisons; those who remain 
indefinitely fuera de la sociedad (outside society) 12 
and whose place of detention is unknown (1980: 47), 
TORTURE 
, ,,to take a man by surprise, without allowing him any 
reflex defense, even psychological fthat is the first 
phase of tortur~. A man's hands are shackled behind 
him, his eyes blindfolded. No one says a word ... 
(Timerman, 1981: JJ) 
The practice of torturing political prisoners first 
became prominent under Gen. Ongan1a (1966-70), but it never 
reached the, Uruguayan degree of cruelty and barbarism or 
the Bolivian scope of the repression (Hodges, 1976: 2). 
Nonetheless, mounting evidences pointed to the Argentine's 
paramilitary security forces' deploJment of torture. Amnesty 
11, (cont'~.) certificates of eligibility (Dept. 
of State, 1980: J). See under Current Poli_sy_No~· _1-76. 
12. Prior to March 1979, the Supreme Court had declared 
that. the problem of the disappeared was outside its realm. It 
was on J March 1979 that "the Supreme Court ... accepted for the 
first time an appeal from a relative of a missing person, the 
father of Alfredo Antonfo Giorgi, a JJ-year-old scientist who 
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International, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Organization 
of the American States documented many serious cases of vio-
lation of human rights in this respect. Former detenees have 
also reported that torture, practiced during the first days 
of the interrogation, took the form of electric shock, immer-
sion of the head in water, mock executions, severe beatings, 
and psychological abuse. Many individuals who disappear at 
the hands of security forces are presumed dead (see eg., Timer-
man, 1981: 50-2). 
We arrived at a certain place. A pair of large 
doors opened up. They squeaked. Dogs barked close 
by. I was taken out of the car and flung onto the 
ground. A long interval elasped. I could hear only 
footsteps. Suddenly, some bursts of laughter. Some-
one approached me and placed what seemed to be the 
barrel of a revolver against my head. He put one hand 
on my head and from up close he said, "I'm going to 
count to ten. Say goodbye, Jacobo dear. It's all 
up to you." 
I said nothing. Again he spoke: 
"Don't you want to say your praJers?" 
I said nothing. He started to count. His voice 
was well modulated --what you might call an educated 
voice. He counted slowly, enunciating clearly. It 
was a pleasant voice. I remained silent, wondering 
was it inevitable for me to die like this? Yes, it 
was inevitable. Was it what I desire1 Yes, it was 
what I desire. Wife, children, I love you. Adios, 
adios, adios ... 
" ... ten. Ha-ha-ha!" 
I heard laughter. I, too, bega131aughing. 
Loudly. (Jacobo Timerman, 1981: 10) 
12. (cont'd.) on 27 November 1978 was taken from 
the National Institute of Industrial Technology (1980: 47), 
lJ. Timerman, later, acknowledged that the very 
fact of his being alive was due to the help of Gens. Videla 
and Viola who converted his disappearance into an arrest. 
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Indeed government security forces had embarked 
on a widespread counter-campaign of violence aimed at terro-
rists as well as elements of the society which they consi-
dered "subversive". Many known or suspected terrorists, as 
well as persons with no subversive record, disappeared 
(Comit~ de defense des droits de l'homme, 1978 documented 
cases of the like). Many others were detained without speci-
fic charge by the executive under the state-of-siege power 
of the constitution. 
The Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Buenos 
Aires carefully recorded and documented list of unexplained 
disappearances contained about 6,500 cases for the period of 
1976-79 (Dept. of State, 24 April 1980: 2), Amnesty Interna-
tional estimated that at least 15,000 persons, or one out of 
every 1,000 adults, have disappeared in the last two and a 
half years (Amnesty International, 1979: 47). There is also 
substantial evidence that most of these people were abducted 
by members of the military or the police forces. The govern-
ment, however, denied any knowledge of the situation. More-
over, the disappeared are not acknowledged as being under de-
tention. It is estimated that 6-8,000 disappeared persons 
are being held at unofficial military camps (Amnesty Interna-
tional, 1980: preface). They are not officially recognized 
by the authority as political prisoners. All writs of Habeas 
Corpus, since the military took over, have been denied. Those 
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who are under detention are denied the right to see lawyers. 
Conditions of detention were often cruel, Serious 
problems of mistreatment, torture, and insufficient medical 
care often existed (Comitt de defense des droits de l'homme, 
1978: 9). According to the Comite, under the regime of Gen. 
Videla the political persecution reaches an extreme violence. 
Officially 2,JOO persons have been killed by the security forces 
and the army between March and December 1976 (Comite de defense 
des droits de l'homme, 1978: 10) 
Critics of the Videla regime often cited the expli-
cit admission by the government that it was indeed deploying 
the use of establishment terrorism. One of such admissions 
was a remark made by Gen. Videla himself two months before 
the coup that brought him to power at the Eleventh Congress 
of American Armed Forces in Montivideo, Uruguay, in which 
he reportedly said: "il faut tuer autant qu'il sera neces-
saire pour retablir la paix (we must kill as many.fterrorist~7 
as required to bring peace back to the country)" (Poutet, 
1978: 246)0 Another one came from a remark made by Alfredo 
Martfnez de Hoz, the Minister of Economy, in which he said in 
September 1978: "Wars are never fought with white gloves; we 
have to use the same drastic methods against the terrorists 
as they themselves have employed" (Amnesty International, 
1980: 11). 

REALITY IS 
THE ONLY TRUTH 
Juan Domingo Peron was strongly influenced by Italian 
fascism and was profoundly nationalistic. He was a member of 
a military lodge --a society committed to: 1) the development 
of an Argentine native industry requisite for a strong pro-
fessional army, and; 2) to social reform as condition for na-
tional unification. 
These so-called "Young Turks", proclaiming the army 
to be the savior of the nation, were intent on direct rule 
based upon the premise that whatever benefited the armed forces 
would also benefit the country. Consequently, the "Revolution 
of 194J" transferred political power from the old landowning 
and commercial bourgeoisie to a new bureaucracy headed by the 
military (see eg., Villanueva, 1975; Rock, 1975; Thompson, 
1978; Hodges, 1976). 
Peron's major contribution to Argentina was in the 
early phase of Argentine peronism in which he demonstrated 
his ability as a leader to mobilize the society from a vantage 
point. Controlling strategic social and political areas, 
Peron was able to shape the future of his country and to affect 
its norms and values (see Hodges, 1976). 
54 
55 
However, economic and structural realities of the 
post-war years indeed dwarfed Peron. His political skills 
were considerable, but they were subjected to the changing 
forces of both the internal and external economic environment. 
We can not talk about the present situation in Argen-
tina (1976-79) without taking into consideration the past. 
Peron and the whole peronist movement left scars that were to 
drastically affect the country. 
What is Truth? 
An Argentine intellectual, Jorge Luis Borges, remarked 
some thirty years ago, Jacobo Timerman recalled, that the 
Argentine is not a citizen but an individual who has no notion 
whatsoever of the nation he resides in; he only sees it as a 
territory filled with wealth readily to be exploited (Timerman, 
1981: 16). With direct reference to that remark, Timerman 
used it to describe the prevailing ideological contradictions 
in the Argentine society: 
Right-wing sectors would accept fthis remart7as an 
absolute truth, claiming that the flood of immigrants 
was responsible for the destruction of the roots im-
planted by the Spanish monarchy --those Hispanic roots 
of the noble Bourbons and of Franco, Immigrants came 
merely to get rich ... It was they who prevented con-
solidation of a notion of citizenry. 
Liberal sectors fwould clai_gy that it was the 
incapacity of the Argentine ruling class to under-
stand the immigrant phenomenon --with all its con-
tributions to creativity, culture, the republican 
and democratic spirit, all its impulse toward civic 
activity, the struggle for human rights and man's 
56 
equality -- and, specifically, the battle of the 
ruling aristocratic groups against unlimited immi-
grant access to eve.ry level of Argentine life ,.,Lp·ar-
ticularlyJ political life, that have prevented na-
tional consolidation, and hence the creation of 
Argentine citizenry. 
Leftist sectors !would argu_gJ that a man can only 
geniuenely feel that he 0 s a ctizen within a socialist 
nation, and therefore no bourgeoisie nation can ex-
pect its inhabitants to share any possible common 
interests. 
Fascists Lwould argu.§.7 that citizens exist only 
when a central power organizes them as such, and 
that it is precisely that central power, which is 
required to give explanation to no one, that is lack-
ing in Argentina. (Timerman, 1981: 16-17) 
As pointed out in chapter two, Peron, while in exile, 
maintained formal alliance with his followers in Argentina in 
the hope of using them to form a strong foundation for his 
quest for political power. His followers were composed of 
two major factions: the Montoneros, consisting mainly of 
urban guerilla, and; the AAA, consisting of policemen and 
retired noncommissioned officers. Coexisting with these two 
were the rural and urban Trotskyite guerillas (ERP); the 
peronist death-squad; the armed terrorist groups of the large 
labor unions; the paramilitary army groups; the para police 
force groups1 and many other minor factions. Both the left 
and the right continue to battle for supremacy within the 
organizations of federal and provincial forces. 
According to Timerman, Juan Peron approved of the use 
of violence (Timerman, 1981: 24). Indeed Peron would lend 
support to any murder, kidnapping, or assault that helped 
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him to achieve his goal "the conquest or reconquest of power" 
(Timerman, 1981: 25). 
"Reality is the only truth," was Peron's slogan. 
It may be interpreted in many different ways. It could mean, 
for instance, "an incitement to give careful and meticulous 
scrutiny to data culled from reality, in order to discover 
peaceful, moderate paths toward a political solution of pro-
blems" (Timerman, 1981: 25). However, it is taken to show 
the peronist's "intolerance of any solution outside the ken 
of its own totalitarian rigidity, and provided the justifica-
tion for utterly irrational acts in the economic, cultural, 
and political spheres; in fact, the only admissable reality 
was peronism, since the peronists were in the majority ... the 
onl;y truth was the peronist way of life £emphasis addei7" 
(Timerman, 1981: 25). 
HIGH FLYING ADORED 
In 1976 Argentina was a country of unusual paradox. 
The government that had previously received overwhelming pu-
blic support was now rapidly losing it. In fact many Argen-
tines urged the military to intervene. Indeed during the 
peronist years saw many problems of violence, economic misma-
nagement, corruption, and an inability to resolve national 
frustrations. 
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As of 1 December, 1975, over 600 people had been 
killed as result of terrorist conflict that had continued 
unabated (Fernandez, 1976: 7J). Economic activities became 
increasingly disruptive. Inflation was running over 200% 
(Fernandez, 1976: 7J). 
The downfall of the peronist government can be 
attributed to many causes, but the most important, perhaps, 
was Isabel Peron's inability to rule. When Juan Peron was 
president, the concept of verticalismo clearly applied to him. 
This concept states that Peron was the unquestioned leader 
of the peronist movement. As president, he was, in effect, 
the source of all real and formal power in the nation. This 
bestowed a mystical aura of functional autonomy to this lea-
dership (see eg., Jordan, 1977 and Fernandez, 1976). With 
Peron's death, however, his widow and his constitutional suc-
cessor did not inherit this authority. Isabel Peron could 
not govern nor could she practice political neutrality. 
"She exacerbated the split between the right and the left-wing 
sectors in the peronist movement" (Fernandez, 1976: 7J). 
THE COUP 
TO END ALL COUPS 
From the time that the military junta assumed complete 
control, it announced that its aims were to: 
assure the later restoration of a republican, . 
representative and federal democracy, in accordance 
with the reality and demands for a solution, and to 
achieve progress for the Argentine people fsic7. (OAS, 1980: 248) -
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The Argentine government argued that in order to 
achieve stated ends, "harmful elements" to the Argentine way 
of life was its principal concern. Indeed the government 
continuously justifies itself in employing repressive tactics 
to legally exterminate these "microbes" from the system, 
Naturally, it is acceptable to most people that a 
government must maintain public order and preserve the safety 
of its inhabitants. It is also acceptable that "in the life 
of any nation, threats to the public order or to personal 
safety of its inhabitants, by persons or groups that use vio-
lence, can reach such proportions that it becomes necessary, 
temporarily, to suspend the exercise of certain human rights" 
(OAS, 1980: 26). However, it is rather difficult to concep-
tualize the use of terror as a form of regular and normal 
gover~ent. 
TERRORISM 
AND 
REPRESSIVE POLITICS 
What constitutes "terrorism" is still highly contro-
versial. Some may feel that the validity of such action as 
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resisting an oppressive totalitarian regime is indeed justi-
fiable. By the same token, others argue that government can 
also justify itself by engaging in acts of establishment ter-
rorism because its aims are to protect and prevent the society 
from destructive elements. Nevertheless, there are others 
who feel that the use of violence in this manner, irregardless 
of the motivation, is considered negative and even criminal 
and must be punished in accordance with applicable law (see 
discussion in Alexander, ed., 1976: xi). 
One of the most common manifestations of revolutionary 
terrorism is the use of sporadic and unyielding "extra-normal" 
non-governmental violence, principally, but not exclusively, 
as component of a transnatio~al revolutionary strategy (see 
eg,, Alexander, 1976; Buckley & Olsen, 1980; Dobson & Payne, 
1979; Halperin, 1976). Significantly enough, the strategy of 
political and ideological violence in the context of domestic 
and transnational revolution and warfare does not prescribe 
immediate victories over established regime or state (Alexander, 
1976: xiv). 
On the contrary, the struggle for fundamental poli-
tical, economic, and social change is seen as com-
plicated and protracted, Terrorist groups, by their 
very nature, are too small and too weak to achieve 
an upper hand in an open struggle for sheer power. 
Violence can therefore accomplish nothing in terms 
of immediate goals. Because of this realization, 
terrorists aim at psychological rather than physi-
cal result. (Alexander, 1976: xiv) 
61 
Hence the purpose of terrorism is to instill an 
emotional state of extreme fear in specific groups and thereby 
to ultimately change their behavior and dispositions, or to 
bring about a general or particular change in the structure 
of the society (Alexander, 1976: xiv). 
Modern terrorism has also introduced a new genera-
tion of warfare in terms of technology, victimization, threat 
and response (see eg., Alexander, 1976; Buckley & Olsen, 1980; 
Dobson & Payne, 1979), Opposition forces today possess highly 
sophisticated and portable instruments of death and destruc-
tion (Alexander, 1976: xv). Modern technology has also pro-
vided both sides of the terrorist spectrum with a facility 
unknown in the past --intercommunication among them across na-
tional boundaries (Alexander, 1976: xv). While revolutionary 
terrorist groups are able to obtain unprecedented news cover-
age for their causes, the establishment terrorists are able 
to abduct refugees or political prisoners from one country to 
another by conspiring with that country in an act of "trans-
national abduction" (see Department of State, 1976, 1977, 1978, 
1979, 1980). Evidences put out by the Department of State 
substantiate the belief that it is prevalent among Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
The sanction of violence coupled with new opportuni-
ties given by the advances in technology has lifted the magni-
tude and brutality of modern terrorism to a scale far higher 
62 
than that of the past (Alexander, 1976: xvi). The intended 
targets of attack are not limited to individuals and property 
with direct involvment in a particular struggle (Alexander, 
1976: xvi). This results, unfortunately, in the wasteful 
death of innocent people. 
The utilization of violence spreads like a contagious 
from which no one remains immune. Tragically being touched 
are the lives of a growing number of defenseless victims who 
are either kidnapped, "disappear", or killed by both forces 
of terrorism (Alexander, 1976: xvi). Indiscriminate and un-
restricted acts of violence have, indeed, turned every place 
one can imagine into a battlefield in which there is no known 
frontier. 
CRY NOT FOR 
ARGENTINA 
The pattern of political change in Argentina may 
well baffle many who believe that democratic government is 
the culmination of political development (see Smith, 1974: 
preface). Despite the alleged socio-economic requisite as 
prescribed by Lipset for democratic growth, Argentina passed 
through a democratic period and then moved on to authorita-
rian forms of government (Smith, 1974: preface). 
Although Samuel P. Huntington may argue that, 
The most important causes of military inter-
vention in politics. are not rnili tary but political 
and reflect not the social and organizational cha-
racteristics of the military establishment but the 
political and institutional structure of the society 
(Huntington, 1968: 194), 
63 
it is, in the view of this author, the explanations of Peter 
H. Smith which are more direct to the point in the Argentine 
case" Smith focused his attention upon: first, the creation 
of professional armed forces imbued officers with such mili-
taristic and anti-democratic values that they use their power 
to overthrow civilian government; second, societal demands 
outstripped institutional capacity to moderate and channel 
conflicts (1974: xvi). 
Moreover, it is important to recognize the fact that 
there has been increasing acceptance of military regimes as 
"normal" political constellations and of military interventions 
as "normal" and·"institutionalized" phenomena. 
The coup of 24 March 1976 was intended as a coup to 
end all coups. The junta announced that its objectives was 
not only the termination of the chaos of the peronist years, 
but also the reconstruction of Argentine society. 1 The 
1. In his book Los que Mandan, Jose Luiz de Irnaz 
argued that from the pattern of military intervention, the 
Argentine army has engaged in a form of incomplete interven-
tion (1964: 45~84). It takes over and then steps out. Irnaz 
believed that this behavior sterns from the high degree of 
military professionalism. The military (as are most Argen-
tines) is largely middle class. It is concerned with the 
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Videla government has expressed sincerity in desiring the 
return of democracy. However, it reasoned that because of 
terrorist warfare, the country must first be rid of this 
menace. 
When a government enjoys broad popular support from 
the people, as does the Videla administration, it seems that 
the method of confronting the threat of terrorism through 
legal neans will always be successful. But the government 
has chosen another method. In effect, it has chosen to under-
take acts of establishment terrorism. 
And what price stability? That the innocent of any 
crime must be sacrified to achieve stated ends is acceptable 
to the government that wants to return the country to demo-
cracy? 
There are two fundamental principals to be recognized: 
first, the rights of a government to maintain public order 
and to preserve personal security of its citizen through the 
rule of the law; second, the rights of the individuals to life, 
1. (cont 0 d.) welfare and security of the nation. 
In addition the military seems to have developed a great dis-
dain for politicians who place partisan interests above national 
honor. But by the same token, its professional values tell 
it not to stay in office too long --good soldiers should not 
mix with politics (Imaz, 1964: 84). 
to due process, and also to personal safety. The former will 
be achieve only if the latter is observed. The government of 
Argentina, no doubt, is sincere in its objectives. But it 
must remember that the price for stability should never ex-
ceed the cost. 
A CONCLUDING WORD 
The main ideas that the author attempts to put forth 
in this thesis are: 
a) no attempts were made to strengthen the institu-
tions' capacities to channel and moderate conflicts 
b) methods employed in solving any political con-
flicts have been, in most instances, through the use 
of the politics of repression 
c) as past Argentine experience has shown (as pointed 
out in chapters two and four) repression as a form of 
regular government did not bringforth stability nor 
did it restore civic and economic order. 
Whether this impression will be clearly understood 
by the readers is another mattero The author would only like 
to reiterate that it is these ideas which he wanted to express. 
He hopes that he had succeeded. 
: - : -
APPIMDIX I: 
Table 1. The Country Risk League Table, 1980 
- . -- ' ~-·~-·;•" ~--- . - -~---··--
Qxmtry 
i\Iexico 
Colombia 
Argentina 
U:::'Llguay 
Chile 
Ec~1ador 
Venezuela 
Panama 
I5:"'ctZil 
Poru 
Costa Rica 
Guatemala 
Central & 
South Ame!·ica World 
ranking . ra...'1king 
1 13 
2 20 
3 23 
4 3,-.) 
5 37 
6 41 
7 50 
8 51 
9 52 
10 54 
11 55 
1~~ 67 
Total vo 1urr:e 
of all loans 
$D 
5315.2 
649. D 
2544. 0 
116.0 
964.7 
1023.5 
657S.4 
225.0 
5548.7 
392.0 
167.5 
50.0 
---·---~-------------·--------- _ ... ___ _ 
Source: Eur·omoney, April 1981 ( supplar;ent), p. 44 
Table 2. Argentina: 
Area (sqmire :!<1T1s) 
Mid-year population, 1979 
Statistical Profile 
Annual population growth ( 1970-78) 
Percentage LL.~ban population, 1978 
Percentage of literacy, 1978 
P,:rcentage of tmiversity students, 1972 
Infant ::ro,taJLty pffi:· 1,000, 1970 
Doctors pe:::-· 1,000 :inh'.1.hLtants, 1969 
Radio rcc-·ive2:s per 1,000, 1971 
T. V. rece i 'v'ers per 1,000, 1971 
Total 
nuinber 
of Joa11s 
41 
s 
23 
4 
28 
14 
38 
2 
44 
11. 
6 
1 
2,776,656 
26.7m 
1.3% 
81.4% 
94. G":b 
1.1;, 
60. :L 
1.9 
370 
144 
Pcrc-,ons per rr.otoT vehicle, 1972 
Petroleum production, 1978 
10.9 
165 ra barrels 
Table 2. (cont 1 d.) 
G::.·oss ncx,;c~tic. Product, 1978 
GDP per C2./ i Lt, 197b 
l\::r·centag(: ·:·,}al GDP, 1980 ;c:_ 
Percentage inf lat ion, 19[30 ( consun,nc price index) a 
Average mm~u.1 rate;:-; of growth: 
GDP 1960-78 
GDP per· capUa 19C-:i0-78 
GD? percenL1.ge distribution by sectors in 1978: 
agriculture 
n:ining 
industry 
constru.ct ion 
serv_i_ces 
Percentag,~ v,ork force: 
in agriculture 
in industry 
in ser\' j ces 
Unc--mplo;-y:nent, Greater Buenos Aires, 1979 
US$~S!':ibn 
US$2,030 
-2.6% 
100.G% 
3.4% 
2. Cf;~ 
13.3% 
1.7% 
35.4% 
4.1% 
45.5% 
14.4% 
31.1% 
54.4% 
2.Cf}b 
Source: 
asource: 
United F!aUons Staf;istical Yearlnok 
E'uromoney, April 1981 (supplement), pp. 49-50 
Table :3. 
Income 
Expenditures 
Defici.t 
Argentine Central Government Operations 
(As a percentage of GDP) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
-----------·---------~-
6.1 
13.0 
6.9 
3.6 
15.6 
12.0 
4.8 
12.2 
7.4 
6.1 
9.5 
3.4 
6.5 
9.0 
2,5 
______________ ._ ______ "_ 
------~------
Source: Organiz.ation of Amer>Lcan States, "Short-term 
Economic Reports, Vol. VIII, Argentina, 11 p. 9 
APPENDIX II: NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINE CIRCULATION 
IN GH.El\TER BU.ENOS A.IRES 
Table 1. Daily Circulation of newspapers in Greater Duenos Aires 
(June 1980) 
Cla.rin 
La Razon 
Cronica (rr:ornir1g edition) 
La Nacion 
La Prensa 
la Opinion 
0:mviccion 
The Buenos Aires Herald (in English) 
420,000 
280,000 
270,000 
220,000 
110.000 
19,000 
3.,000 
18,000 
Source: La-tin A,11en:CJa Heekly Report, 25 July 1980, p. 6 
* * * * * * 
Table 2. Hagazine Circulation in Greater Buenos Aire!:> 
(in millions 
of lff11 
pesos) 
8001-- . 
100'-- · 
l-- -600 
5001· 
,- . 
400L ___ ~( 
1!366 o·, v8 
&)Urce: 
74 75 ---"Tu-· -Tr-7"8-· -79 
Latin America Feekly Report, 11 July 1980, p. 9 
.APPENDIX I I I: 1 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGIITS 
IN ARGENTINA, 1972-78 
----·-·--··---······~-~-------~ 
Year 
1972 
197~3 
1971  
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978. 
Po1itical 
Rights 2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
6-
6 
6 
Ci YJil 
Rights 3 
3 
2 
4-
4 
5-,-. 
6- a 
5+ 
(1 = best score; 7 = ~urst sco~e) 
1c This ''freedom'' sarvcy, conducted annually by Freedom Hrnme, 
defines freedom in terms of lx)th civil and p<>litical :free<h'718 
ao these have been traditionally understood :.n the constitu-
tional denDcratic states. 
2" The score for poliUcal rights is dete:rCTi.ned by the degree 
to whJcl1 a given cmmtry satisfies the follo-,,·:ng requirements: 
(a) tlu t J ca.ders are chosen in decisions mad 0: on the basis of 
an open voting process, (b) that signlficant oppo.sttion is 
allowed to cor:ipete in this procei:;s, (c) th."'tt the.re are multiple 
· political part1es and ca11didates not selected by the govern-
ment, ( d) that poll ing and cotmting votes is conducted without 
coercion or fraud, (e) that a s1gnificant share of political 
:powe.r: is exer·cj.sed by elected repx-esentatives, (f) that all 
regions, even the rmst rLYrote, are included in the political 
process, and (g) that the country is free o:f foreign or mi1i-
ta:.:y control o.r influence, Countries assif.:,'Ti~>cl a rank of 1 
rrnst closely satisfy thes,,, :requirements and those assigned a 
rank of 7 most seriously violate them. 
3. The sc~o-re :for civil right,; is determined by the degree of 
lib0rty a give.a cou.11.try grants its news r.1edia and individual 
citizens, pr.irri.arily as it applies to political e:h,j:lress.ion. 
The survey look..c; at censorship applied to the press or radio. 
(cont'd.) 
It also assesse::; t.h~ rights grrmted ax1y indiv:id:..tal to openly 
t:xp::·es~.:; ideas, to be1ong to an o:r-ganizd.lion :·ree of goV(i::-n-
munt SU't)ervision, c:U1d the individ,nl's right to a :fair trial 
i. o. , t hf: degn.:;e to ,vliich the j udic.iary is ir iclependent of 
adr:1i,nistrative contro1. Also :irnpurtant is t1w number of: poli-
tical prisoners hE!ld :in the country, the use of torture or 
brutality, and the deg,TeE-! to which the state security forces 
res1Jeet individual rights. Countries assigned the rank of 1 
grant the greatest degree of civil liberties and those assigned 
the rmik of 7 rrust seriously violate than. 
a. Cha11ge in st2.tus since the previous year owing to reevaluation 
by the author. 'I'his does not jmp1y any chan.ge in the country. 
Sou.::ce: Statist1:cal Abstract; of Latin !,,merica_, Vol. 20 
---··,------~·------------------~----------·---""·--· 
APPENDIX IV: CHRONOLOGY OF TERROR, 1968-76 l 
Date 
1068 
October 6 
1~)72 
March 21 
1973 
June 6 
December 6 
1975 
tTur1e 
Place 
Cordoba 
Buenos 
ld:res 
Bs. P.s. 
Bs. P._s. 
Bs. As. 
Incident 
-----------
Ibrribs da::mge off ices of US 
COCJpa..11ies: :First Natioaal Bank, 
Pepsi-Cola, Squibb a11d Dunlop Tires. 
Start of three-d.:'l.y campaign o:f bomblng 
US institutions .. 
Group 
Unknmm 
Oberd'<Ul Sallustro, president of ERP 
Fiat of Argentina, is kidnapped. F5at 
agrees to pay $1 million ransom and 
reinstate 250 ·workers fired in industrial 
dispute. Government refuses to release 
50 prisoners, launches a hunt for tho 
kidnappers' hideout, finds and &urrrnmds · 
it. Just before soldiers attack, the 
tm·:·orists carry out thei!' thr~:at and 
r.mrder Sa1lustro. 
Cha:rles Lockwood, a British 
businessr!'.an, is kidnapped and held 
for 53 days until he is ranSOi"":'ied for 
$2 million. Lockwood is later 
kidnapped by another group. He tells 
then that it is unfair to expect a. 
"second suck at the orange." · 
Victo:r SaIITJPlson, Pmerica.n execu-
tive of Exxon, i:::: kidnapped and ran-
somed for the· h1-1gc · sum of $14. 2 million. 
Released on April 29, 1974. 
Jorge and Juan Born, sons of 
ERP/ 
splinter 
group 
ERP 
Montoneros 
(Co!lt'd.) 
Date 
1976 
June 1.8 
July 19 
Place 
Bs. As 
A:rgentLr:ia 
Inc.iden t Grollp 
·---·-. ---·. ---
Jorge Born, chairr.-:!an o-f the Bu.nge y 
Born comnercial empi:re, were · 
kid..;apped and ranscmed for $60 1:1:Ulion 
in cash and $1.2 .r.ti.llion in food 
and cl.othing distributed to the poor. 
General Cesareo Cardozo, chief ERP 
of Federal Police, is killed by lxmb 
exploding m1der his bed. The bomb 
was believed to have been placed there 
by a :friend of his daughter. He is 
the second chi.ef killed in 1.ess than 
two yearr;. 
Roberto Santucho, overall leader 
of the E[ll?, is killed in battle with 
the author.i.ties. His death is a 
severe blow to the rrDvement . 
1. This ehronology lists "those acts c< terrorisn wh:ich, 
over the last 10 yea.rs, have actua:ny af fer.te<1 the coHrse 
o:f. national and \'.Drld affair (Dobson and hiyrn.-1, 1979: 203)." 
Som·ce: From wbson and Payne ( 1979: 203-225) 
APFE.NDIX V: TEHROHIST GROUPS l 
ARGENTINA 
Montoneros 
Or;gfns: Fnrrned by left-wing supporters of Peron, it has 
strong affi>,tions with the trade union movement. Dis-
appointed '.vtth Peron's performance and that of his wi<l-
ow, who succeeded him. the Montoneros emerged in 1975 
as the guerilla wing of the Authentic Peronist Party. 
Ideology and aims: It was reported in February 1976 
that thi,:.; group saw itself engaged in a "war of libera-
tion" invnlving a socialist revoluti,m an<l the defeat of 
the "iri1peralism" of foreign capital. Its aims in fact recall 
the original ideals of Peronisrn with their glorification of 
the desccunisaclos (the shirtless ones). 
Activities: Has carried out assassinations, bombings and 
kidnappings, and has made an attempt to seize control of 
the trade unions through an underground amalgamation 
of unions called the Confederation General de Trabajo en 
Resistencia (the General Confederation of Workers for 
Resistance). Also took part in the rural guerilla earn-· 
paign with ERP and armed itself by setting up weapons 
factories-with expert help from the trade unions-to 
produce its own arms. 
International links: None are known; the Montoneros is 
essentially an Argentinian group. 
Achievements: Has had considerable success in its trade 
union activities, provoking strikes and engagir1g in in-
dustrial sabotage. But is under increasing pressufe from 
the security forces. 
Strength: At one sbge the group was estimated to have a 
well-m·ganized military force of some 7,500-this has 
now b~en whittled down to less than 2,000. Roberto Quie-
to, one of its founder-leaders, was captured in December 
1975, and the lerrdership is now in the hands of l\1ario 
Firmenich. It still has extensive support; in the factories 
and, lil:e ERP, among radical priests, though less so 
among, lte intellectuals. 
Future prospects: In the latter part of 1976 and 1977 the 
Montoneros became less effective due to pressure from 
the military government, but through working-class sup-
port it could still pose a threat to Argentina's stability, 
although this would stem more from industrial action 
than L1!rrorism. 
ARGENTINA 
Ejercito Revo!ucionario del Pueblo (ERP) 
Origins: Founded in 1969 by Roberto Santucho as the 
armed branch of the Revolutionary Workers' Party. It 
started operations in 1970, three years after the death of 
Che Guevara, who had rejected Argentina as the most 
suitable place to set up a revolutionary foco in favor of 
Bolivia, a choice that was to lead to his death. 
Ideology and aims: Marxist-Leninist, with a strong vein 
of Trotskyism. The group is dedicated to the overthrow of 
the capitalist system in Argentina and other South 
American countries. 
Activities: Has carried out a unique combined program of 
urban terrorism and rural guerilla warfare. In the to\vns 
it has concentrated on raising money through the kid-
napping of foreign businessmen and diplomats, the mur-
der of officials and of members of right-wing assassina-
tion teams, and a general assault on the stn1ctun• of so-
ciety. In the countryside large forces of combined ERP 
and Montoneros fighters, sometimes in battalion 
strength, have taken on the army in pitched battles, The 
bloodiest of these actions took place on December 22. 
1975 when an estimated 500 ERP guerillas tried to storm 
the barracks at Monte Chingolo, only a few mile::; south 
of Buenos Aires. The garrison seems to have been fore-
warnec.l and was ready for the attacking party. The 
fighting went on all night and in the end six civikrns, 
nine soldiers, and 85 g1.v~rillas lay dead. It \Vas a d::-;vas-
tating blow and followed a series of defeats in the gueril-
las' attempts to occupy a "liberated area" in the rugged 
mountains and jungle of Tucuman. They lost an estimat-
ed 600 men in this campaign, including Santucho's 
brother, Asdrubal. These losses forced a change in tac-
tics. Fewer large-scale operations were mounted and 
none of them involved more than 50 men and wor:1en. 
The grot.1p turned increasingly to urban warfare and se-
lective ,' :;;assination. In July 1976, however, ERP was 
dealt a; ,~ow that may prove f;,tal. Roberto Santucho. his 
second-; t-command, Jose Urteaga, and several other 
leader:. Nere killed when the police raided their hideout 
in a Btwnos Aires apartment. Since then the scale of ac-
tivity has dropped dramatically. -
1. so-,irco: Adapted fron Dobson &"'1d Payne (1979: 180-183). 
/nt,,,·national lin{(s: The ERP cooperates with mosl of the · 
othn· Soulh Anwrican groups through an organization 
called the Junta de Co-ordinacion Revolucionaria (JCR). , 
Establislrnd in 1974 to facilitate joint planning, f unqing ! 
and su~)port, the JCR was <lep,.,ndent financially on the : 
ERP. Since the authorities in South America began to 
inflict heavy casualties on the revolutionaries in the 
mi<l-1970s, the JCR's ov,,:seas headquarters in Paris has 
become increasingly important. Assassinations ·of South 
American ambassador', in Europe have been carried out 
under the auspices of :.'.,e JCR, terrorist cells hn.ve been 
set up in a number of countries and links have been es-
tablished with European and Palestinian groups. Other 
members of the JCR are Bolivia's National Liberation 
Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary 
Ldt (MIR), Paraguay's National Liberation Front (Fre-
pal; .1~1) and Uruguay's Tupamaro5 (MLN). 
Achievements: The ERP has become rich and has caused 
the deaths of many people. But it has failed in its aim of 
bringing about revolution in Argentina. It is one of the 
idi:ological touchstones of terrorists that if they can suc-
ceed in pr,,voking a right-wing coup or the enforcement 
of extremely repressive measures, a countermovement 
will inevitably arise to destroy the government and bring 
about the revolution. But in both Uru1c,iuay and Argen-
tina exactly the opposite has happened. The right-wing 
governm~,nts brought to power because of revolutionary 
terrorism have crippled the terrorist movements in both 
countries. ERP activities also caused the formation of 
right-wing terrorist groups, notably the Alian?'.a An-
ticomunist.a Argentina, better known as the Triple A. 
This organization, \vhich operated with some official sup-
port and included policemen and soldiers in its ranks, 
killed anyone suspected of supporting the ERP or the 
Montone,{)3. They tortured, then shot their victims and 
left them lying literally in heaps around Buenos Aires. 
They foug:1t a war of kill and counter kill even more ruth-. 
less than t.hat fought between the Arabs and the Israelis 
after M,;:1ich. However, with the decrease in the ERP's 
adivitiPs and the strong line taken by the military gov-
ernment of General Jorge Videla, this organization, too, 
has become less adive. 
Strength: Despite the losses among the fighters, there is 
still considerable support for the aims of the ERP, es-
pecially among intellectuals, radical priest:?. of the Ro-
man Catholic Church and left-wing trade m,·,,nists. 
Future prospects: As its strength is being whittled 
away, the ERP is likely to turn more and more to classic 
urb::m terrorism, operating in small units. It remains in 
existence but is hard pressed and could only return to its 
days of glory if there was a major political uphca val in 
Ar~.;entina. 
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